@article{Herzog2021,
  author    = {Herzog, Bodo},
  title     = {Optimal sequencing to reform the European Economic and Monetary Union: a roadmap},
  journal   = {Quantiative finance and economics},
  volume    = {5},
  number    = {2},
  issn      = {2573-0134},
  doi       = {10.3934/QFE.2021014},
  institution = {ESB Business School},
  pages     = {311 -- 324},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {In this paper, we examine the political gridlock in reforming the Economic and Monetary Union. We utilize a two-stage game with imperfect information in order to study the optimal sequencing. The main results are: first, optimal sequencing requires for incompliant Member States a default option in stage-two, which in principle is related to the today's fiscal architecture (EMU-I). Second, we show that compliant countries prefer a reform equilibrium today if and only if they have a free choice about the preferred fiscal architecture at the end — either EMU-II with binding European coordination or EMU-I related to Maastricht. Noteworthy, our sequencing approach works for any design of the EMU-II architecture.},
  language  = {en}
}