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Corona-Bonds und EU-Verschuldung: Zukunftsvision oder Europäische Naivität?

  • This article studies the current debate on Coronabonds and the idea of European public debt in the aftermath of the Corona pandemic. According to the EU-Treaty economic and fiscal policy remains in the sovereignty of Member States. Therefore, joint European debt instruments are risky and trigger moral hazard and free-riding in the Eurozone. We exhibit that a mixture of the principle of liability and control impairs the present fiscal architecture and destabilizes the Eurozone. We recommend that Member States ought to utilize either the existing fiscal architecture available or establish a political union with full sovereignty in Europe. This policy conclusion is supported by the PSPP-judgement of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on 5 May 2020. This ruling initiated a lively debate about the future of the Eurozone and Europe in general.

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Metadaten
Author of HS ReutlingenHerzog, Bodo
URL:https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/zfwp/69/2/article-p148.xml
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1515/zfwp-2020-2032
ISSN:0721-3808
eISSN:2366-0317
Erschienen in:Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik / Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik an der Universität zu Köln
Publisher:De Gruyter Oldenbourg
Place of publication:Berlin
Document Type:Article
Language:German
Year of Publication:2020
Tag:Bundesverfassungsgericht; Corona Pandemie; EU Verschuldung; Eurobonds; Europäische Währungsunion; Europäischer Gerichtshof
Volume:69
Issue:2
Page Number:18
First Page:148
Last Page:165
DDC classes:330 Wirtschaft
Open Access?:Nein
Licence (German):License Logo  Lizenzbedingungen De Gruyter