Refine
Year of publication
- 2014 (1)
Document Type
- Journal article (1)
Language
- English (1)
Has full text
- yes (1)
Is part of the Bibliography
- yes (1)
Institute
Publisher
- Canadian Center of Science and Education (1) (remove)
This paper develops a new governance scheme for a stable and lasting European Monetary Union (EMU). I demonstrate that existing economic governance is based on flawed incentives especially due to insufficient macroeconomic coordination, failures of institutional enforcement and animal spirit in financial markets. All this caused the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010. Consequently, the EMU crisis is not a conundrum at all rather a failure of national and supranational governance. To tackle this problem, I propose a return to flexible but compulsory rules driven by market forces. The new governance principles shall promote the compliance and effective enforcement of rules.