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Die hohen Schulden in einigen Staaten der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion lassen nach wie vor staatliche Insolvenzen befürchten. Um die bereits entstandenen Probleme zu bewältigen, aber auch damit eine solche Situation künftig gar nicht erst eintritt, ist eine staatliche Insolvenzordnung erforderlich.
This article investigates the fundamental value of digital platforms, such as Facebook and Google. Despite the transformative nature of digital technologies, it is challenging to value digital services, given that the usage is free of charge. Applying the methodology of discrete choice experiments, we estimated the value of digital free goods. For the first time in the literature, we obtained data for the willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept, together with socio-economic variables. The customer´s valuation of free digital services is on average, for Google, 121 € per week and Facebook, 28 €.
The paper studies the reform package proposed by the European Commission on 6 December 2017. First, institutional and economic implications of the reform proposal are analysed. The paper finds that some proposals are beyond the present treaty provisions. For instance, the proposal of a fiscal capacity does not tackle the economic root causes without a supranational transfer mechanism. In fact, the proposed budget neutrality over the medium-term is unfeasible due to cross country heterogeneity in the Eurozone. At the end, the paper develops policy conclusions.
This paper studies whether a monetary union needs a fical union in particular in the Eurozone. On 1 January 1999, despite controversial debates, the rule-based Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) started without a fiscal union. I show that there is weak economic convergence in the EMU since 18 years. In addition, I argue that a fiscal union does not solve the past disintegration failures.
I demonstrate that the major flaws are domestic policy failures and not institutional failures in the euro area. Consequently, establishing a monetary union without having a political union is a risky strategy. Indeed, the rule-based architecture of Maastricht is not guilty for the crisis alone. The root causes are the political flaws aligned with the rather weak enforcement of the rules. I propose a genuine redesign of the rule-based paradigm without a fiscal union. Yet a monetary union without a fiscal union works effectively if the rule enforcement is more automatic and independent of domestic and European policy-making.