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This article examines the risks and societal costs associated with flexible average inflation targeting in the United States and symmetric inflation targeting in the Eurozone. Employing an empirical approach, we analyze monthly cumulative inflation gaps over a monetary policy horizon of 36 months. By investigating the trajectories of the cumulative inflation gaps, we find a heavy tailed distribution and a 20 percent probability of over- and undershooting the inflation target. We exhibit that the offsetting mechanism introduced in the revised monetary strategies lack credibility in ensuring price stability during a period of persistent inflation. Consequently, the credibility of central banks may be compromised. The policy implications are the integration of an escape clause and prompt monetary corrections in cases where the inflation goal is not achieved. This study provides insights for policymakers and central banks, emphasizing challenges in maintaining credibility and price stability within the new monetary strategies.
Das Buch „The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism“ von Martin Wolf ist eine gut 500-seitige Untersuchung des aktuellen Zustands des demokratischen Kapitalismus. Wolf liefert eine eingehende Analyse der Ursachen und Folgen, die zu dieser Krise geführt haben, sowie mögliche Lösungsansätze. Dieses Buch ist eine unverzichtbare Lektüre für jeden, der verstehen will, wie sich unser Wirtschaftssystem im kommenden Jahrzehnt ändern muss.
This article provides a stochastic agent-based model to exhibit the role of aggregation metrics in order to mitigate polarization in a complex society. Our sociophysics model is based on interacting and nonlinear Brownian agents, which allow us to study the emergence of collective opinions. The opinion of an agent, x i (t) is a continuous positive value in an interval [0, 1]. We find (i) most agent-metrics display similar outcomes. (ii) The middle-metric and noisy-metric obtain new opinion dynamics either towards assimilation or fragmentation. (iii) We show that a developed 2-stage metric provide new insights about convergence and equilibria. In summary, our simulation demonstrates the power of institutions, which affect the emergence of collective behavior. Consequently, opinion formation in a decentralized complex society is reliant to the individual information processing and rules of collective behavior.
Das aufsehenerregende Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts in Sachen Staatsanleiheankäufe der Europäischen Zentralbank verlangt eine ökonomische und verfassungsrechtliche Gesamtschau. Vor allem im interdisziplinären Kontext erschließt sich die herausfordernde Abgrenzung der supranationalen Währungspolitik von der nationalen Wirtschaftspolitik. Der im Urteil neuentwickelte Standpunkt ist in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur unterschätzt, obzwar tradierte und neue rechtspolitische Grundsätze für die zukünftige Ausformung der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion subsumiert werden.
On 5 May 2020, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany announced in a momentous ruling that the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the European Central Bank (ECB) exceeds European Union (EU) competences. This decision initiated a lively debate in law and economics all over Europe. This article provides a unique interdisciplinary reading of the ruling in order to clarify the line of argument. Considering a cross-disciplinary view enlightens the understanding of the historic judgment.
Weltweit und in Deutschland erreicht das Thema Inflation neue Höchststände in der Aufmerksamkeit (Google-Trends 2022). Nach einer vielbeachteten und millionenfach angesehenen Online-Weihnachtsvorlesung aus dem Jahre 2020 hat der Ökonomieprofessor Hans-Werner Sinn das Buch mit gleichnamigem Titel „Die wundersame Geldvermehrung“ veröffentlicht. Abermals könnte es dem Autor gelingen die politische Öffentlichkeit damit aufzurütteln.
Since Adam Smith, the “homo oeconomicus” is the behavioural model in economics. Commonly this model characterizes a selfish individual, a kind of ruthless type, whose greed for profit seems to take precedence over moral values. Already 100 years ago, Max Weber provided a modernization of the model concerning the methodological individualism. Recent research in cognitive sciences reveals a further modernization of this standard model in economics. Neuro-economics, a highly interdisciplinary research field, is building a new behavioural consensus. This article examines the new properties of the “neuro-homo oeconomicus”. We show that the new behavioural model is rather similar to the long-standing economic prototype. To that extent, the neuro-model is more hype than hope. In principle, this article considers an ancient philosophical question about the nature of humans in general.
Das Phänomen des Populismus wird in den verschiedensten wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen seit Jahrzehnten erörtert. Dss vorherrschende Narrativ ist aber ökonomischer Natur. Die (Finanz-)Globalisierung und der technologische Fortschritt entfremden die Menschen und bewirken Verunsicherung. Zudem erkennen die Bürger mehr die Herausforderungen als die Chancen in diesem Transformationsprozess.
This paper generalizes the theory of policy uncertainty with the new literature on rational inattention. First, the model demonstrates that inattention is dependent on the signal variance and the policy parameter. Second, I discover a novel trade-off showing that a policy instrument mitigates attention. Third, the policy instrument is non-linear and reciprocal to both the size and variance of the signal. The unifying theory creates new implications to economic theory and public policy alike.
This paper studies whether a monetary union needs a fical union in particular in the Eurozone. On 1 January 1999, despite controversial debates, the rule-based Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) started without a fiscal union. I show that there is weak economic convergence in the EMU since 18 years. In addition, I argue that a fiscal union does not solve the past disintegration failures.
I demonstrate that the major flaws are domestic policy failures and not institutional failures in the euro area. Consequently, establishing a monetary union without having a political union is a risky strategy. Indeed, the rule-based architecture of Maastricht is not guilty for the crisis alone. The root causes are the political flaws aligned with the rather weak enforcement of the rules. I propose a genuine redesign of the rule-based paradigm without a fiscal union. Yet a monetary union without a fiscal union works effectively if the rule enforcement is more automatic and independent of domestic and European policy-making.