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This paper studies the impact of governmental transparency on the political business cycle. The literature on electoral cycles finds evidence that cycles depend on the stage of the economy. However, we show a reliance of the cycle on transparency. We use data for G7 countries and compare it with less developed OECD countries. Our theory states that transparency reduces the political cycles due to peer pressure and by voting outs. We confirm the theory with an econometric assessment of 34 countries from 1970 to 2012. We discover smaller cycles in countries with a higher transparency, especially in G7-countries.
This paper examines the relationship of asset Price determination via Google data. To capture this relation, I create a model and estimate several time series’ regressions. I use weekly data from 2004 to 2010 from 30 international banks. To my knowledge this is the first study which differentiates between Google’s search volume and Google’s search clicks. I show that asset prices are positively related to the rate of change in Google’s search volume, trading volume and the level of Google search clicks. Secondly, I demonstrate that the absolute level of Google’s search volume and Google’s search clicks
behave differently regarding the asset price dynamics. Google’s search volume, which measures long-run searches, is negatively related while Google’s search clicks have a positive relationship to asset prices. Hence, Google’s data offer new insights on both measuring attention and pricing financial assets.
This paper develops a new governance scheme for a stable and lasting European Monetary Union (EMU). I demonstrate that existing economic governance is based on flawed incentives especially due to insufficient macroeconomic coordination, failures of institutional enforcement and animal spirit in financial markets. All this caused the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010. Consequently, the EMU crisis is not a conundrum at all rather a failure of national and supranational governance. To tackle this problem, I propose a return to flexible but compulsory rules driven by market forces. The new governance principles shall promote the compliance and effective enforcement of rules.
This white paper builds a new financial theory of euro area sovereign bond markets under stress. The theory explains the abnormal bond pricing and increasing spreads during the recent market turmoil. We find that the strong disconnect of bond spreads from the respective bonds’ underlying fundamental values in 2010 was triggered by an increase in asymmetric information and weak reputation of government policies. Both factors cause a normal bond market to switch into a crisis mode. Finally, those markets are prone to self-fulfilling bubbles in which the economic effects are amplified by herding behaviour arising from animal spirits. Altogether, this produces contagious effects and multiple equilibria. Thus, we argue that government bond markets in a monetary union are more fragile and vulnerable to liquidity and solvency crises. Consequently, the systemic mispricing of sovereign debt creates more macroeconomic instability and bubbles in the euro area than in a single country. In other words, financial markets are partly blind to national default risks in a currency union. Therefore, the current European institutional framework puts the wrong incentives in place and needs structural changes soon. To tackle the root causes we suggest more market incentives via consistent rules, pre-emptive austerity measures in good economic times, and a resolution scheme for heavily indebted countries. In summary, our paper enhances the bond market theory and provides new insights into the recent bond market turmoil in Europe.
Applied mathematical theory for monetary-fiscal interaction in a supranational monetary union
(2014)
I utilize a differentiable dynamical system á la Lotka-Voletrra and explain monetary and fiscal interaction in a supranational monetary union. The paper demonstrates an applied mathematical approach that provides useful insights about the interaction mechanisms in theoretical economics in general and a monetary union in particular. I find that a common central bank is necessary but not sufficient to tackle the new interaction problems in a supranational monetary union, such as the free-riding behaviour of fiscal policies. Moreover, I show that upranational institutions, rules or laws are essential to mitigate violations of decentralized fiscal policies.
Die Finanzkrise lies Europa und die Welt erzittern - die Staatsverschuldungskriese wurde zur Zerreißprobe für die Eurozone. Inzwischen hat sich die Situation wieder stabilisiert, doch nun steht die Eurozone vor der Herausforderung, einen Reform-Prozess anzustoßen, der das Überleben des Euros auf lange Sicht sichern soll.
This paper provides new evidence on the formation and anchoring of inflation expectations. I conduct a game experiment and analyze the adjustment as well as the impact of credible targets on expectations. In addition, I evaluate the idiosyncratic determinants on the formation of expectations. The analysis reveals six results: First, I find evidence that long-term inflation expectations are firmly anchored to a credible target. Second, a temporary deviation due to unexpected monetary policy might trigger a decline in credibility, and third a de-anchoring of expectations due to uncertainty. Fourth, I find that people change their expectations little if a credible target exists. Fifth, expectations exhibit a large degree of time-variance only in environments without a target. Sixth, the dynamic adjustment to an ‘incomplete’ equilibrium, which is theoretically unstable, is nevertheless rapid and persistent in case of credible targets. All in all, I demonstrate a unique game setup with contributions to both experimental and monetary economics.
A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that money market freezes have major macroeconomic implications. This paper develops a tractable model in which we analyze the microeconomic and macroeconomic implications of a systemic banking crisis. In particular, we consider how the systemic crisis affects the optimal allocation of funding for businesses. We show that a central bank should reduce the interest rate to manage a systemic shock and hence smooth the macroeconomic consequences. Moreover, the analysis offers insight on the rational of bank behavior and the role of markets in a systemic crisis. We find that the failure to adopt the optimal policy can lead to economic fragility.
Usually financial crises go along with bubbles in asset prices, such as the housing bubble in the US in 2007. This paper attempts to build a mathematical model of financial bubbles from an econophysics, and thus a new perspective. I find that agents identify bubbles only with a time delay. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the detection of bubbles is different on either the individual or collective point of view. Second, I utilize the findings for a new definition of asset bubbles in finance. Finally, I extend the model to the study of asset price dynamics with news. In conclusion, the model provides unique insights into the properties and developments of financial bubbles.
The paper designs a quantum model of decision-making (QMDM) that utilizes neuroscientific evidence. The new model provides both normative and positive implications to economics. First, it enhances the study of decision-making which is an extension of the expected utility theory (EUT) in mathematical economics. Second, we demonstrate how the quantum model mitigates drawbacks of the expected utility theory of today.