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Das aufsehenerregende Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts in Sachen Staatsanleiheankäufe der Europäischen Zentralbank verlangt eine ökonomische und verfassungsrechtliche Gesamtschau. Vor allem im interdisziplinären Kontext erschließt sich die herausfordernde Abgrenzung der supranationalen Währungspolitik von der nationalen Wirtschaftspolitik. Der im Urteil neuentwickelte Standpunkt ist in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur unterschätzt, obzwar tradierte und neue rechtspolitische Grundsätze für die zukünftige Ausformung der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion subsumiert werden.
This paper studies the impact of financial liquidity on the macro-economy. We extend a classic macroeconomic modeland compute numerical simulations. The model confirms that persistently low inflation can occur despite a high degreeof financial liquidity due to a reallocation of cash, normal and risk-free bonds. In that regard, our model uncovers anexplanation of a flat Phillips curve. Overall, our approach contributes to a rather disregarded matter in macroeconomictheory.
This article studies the current debate on Coronabonds and the idea of European public debt in the aftermath of the Corona pandemic. According to the EU-Treaty economic and fiscal policy remains in the sovereignty of Member States. Therefore, joint European debt instruments are risky and trigger moral hazard and free-riding in the Eurozone. We exhibit that a mixture of the principle of liability and control impairs the present fiscal architecture and destabilizes the Eurozone. We recommend that Member States ought to utilize either the existing fiscal architecture available or establish a political union with full sovereignty in Europe. This policy conclusion is supported by the PSPP-judgement of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on 5 May 2020. This ruling initiated a lively debate about the future of the Eurozone and Europe in general.
Since Adam Smith, the “homo oeconomicus” is the behavioural model in economics. Commonly this model characterizes a selfish individual, a kind of ruthless type, whose greed for profit seems to take precedence over moral values. Already 100 years ago, Max Weber provided a modernization of the model concerning the methodological individualism. Recent research in cognitive sciences reveals a further modernization of this standard model in economics. Neuro-economics, a highly interdisciplinary research field, is building a new behavioural consensus. This article examines the new properties of the “neuro-homo oeconomicus”. We show that the new behavioural model is rather similar to the long-standing economic prototype. To that extent, the neuro-model is more hype than hope. In principle, this article considers an ancient philosophical question about the nature of humans in general.
Das Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfG) vom 5. Mai 2020 ist Schlusspunkt und zugleich Neuanfang nach einer jahrelangen verfassungsrechtlichen und ökonomischen Auseinandersetzung. Im Prinzip geht es um die konstituierenden Prinzipien der Eurozone sowie das Mandat der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB). Der EU-Vertrag charakterisiert die Leitplanken der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (WWU) im Spannungsfeld der Art. 119, 123 und 125 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union (AEUV). Mithin liegt die wirtschaftspolitische Souveränität – nach dem Prinzip Haftung und Kontrolle – allein bei den Mitgliedstaaten. Die Organe der Europäischen Union (EU) sowie der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union (EuGH) legen diese Leitplanken gemäß dem Leitgedanken in Art. 1 des Vertrags über die Europäische Union (EUV) einer „ever closer union“ regelmäßig mit weitem Ermessen aus.
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been in turmoil for more than six years. The present governance rules do not seem to solve the problems neither permanently nor effectively. There is no vision about the future of Europe in the 21st century. This article describes a realignment of the economic governance, which does not necessarily lead to a transfer or political union. However, it solves the current and future challenges. In fact, the redesign of present rules is the most likely as well as legally and economically option today. The key ideais the detachment from the compulsive idea of an ever closer union. However, this vision requires boldness towards greater flexibility together with an exit clause or a state insolvency procedure for incompliant member states.
The paper studies the reform package proposed by the European Commission on 6 December 2017. First, institutional and economic implications of the reform proposal are analysed. The paper finds that some proposals are beyond the present treaty provisions. For instance, the proposal of a fiscal capacity does not tackle the economic root causes without a supranational transfer mechanism. In fact, the proposed budget neutrality over the medium-term is unfeasible due to cross country heterogeneity in the Eurozone. At the end, the paper develops policy conclusions.
This article investigates the fundamental value of digital platforms, such as Facebook and Google. Despite the transformative nature of digital technologies, it is challenging to value digital services, given that the usage is free of charge. Applying the methodology of discrete choice experiments, we estimated the value of digital free goods. For the first time in the literature, we obtained data for the willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept, together with socio-economic variables. The customer´s valuation of free digital services is on average, for Google, 121 € per week and Facebook, 28 €.
Die hohen Schulden in einigen Staaten der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion lassen nach wie vor staatliche Insolvenzen befürchten. Um die bereits entstandenen Probleme zu bewältigen, aber auch damit eine solche Situation künftig gar nicht erst eintritt, ist eine staatliche Insolvenzordnung erforderlich.