Refine
Document Type
- Journal article (54) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- yes (54)
Institute
- ESB Business School (54)
Publisher
- MDPI (12)
- Springer (4)
- Scienpress (3)
- Centre of Sociological Research (2)
- Elsevier (2)
- Science Publishing Group (2)
- Scientific & Academic Publishing (2)
- Scientific Research Publishing (2)
- AIMS Press (1)
- ASME (1)
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been in turmoil for more than six years. The present governance rules do not seem to solve the problems neither permanently nor effectively. There is no vision about the future of Europe in the 21st century. This article describes a realignment of the economic governance, which does not necessarily lead to a transfer or political union. However, it solves the current and future challenges. In fact, the redesign of present rules is the most likely as well as legally and economically option today. The key ideais the detachment from the compulsive idea of an ever closer union. However, this vision requires boldness towards greater flexibility together with an exit clause or a state insolvency procedure for incompliant member states.
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of transparency on the political budget cycle (PBC) over time and across countries. So far, the literature on electoral cycles finds evidence that cycles depend on the stage of an economy. However, the author shows – for the first time – a reliance of the budget cycle on transparency. The author uses a new data set consisting of 99 developing and 34 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries. First, the author develops a model and demonstrates that transparency mitigates the political cycles. Second, the author confirms the proposition through the econometric assessment. The author uses time series data from 1970 to 2014 and discovers smaller cycles in countries with higher transparency, especially G8 countries.
The paper studies liquidity management in the banking sector at the zero lower bound implemented by central banks. The new era of monetary policy with interest rates at zero and quantitative easing programs raise questions about the effectiveness of central banking policy and their impact on the banking sector. I find that the zero lower bound reduces liquidity reserves of banks and thus creates less credit supply. The T-LTRO program, developed by the European Central Bank, has helped to tackle this problem. However, the recently expanded asset purchase program reveals the opposite effect. Hence, the recent liquidity provisions by central banks have put incentives rather on de-leveraging than bank lending.
This article analyses and compares the performance of regulators in the fields of finance and sport, especially cycling. I hypothesize that the courses of crises or scandals is the best time to study the lessons of regulatory response. First, I take into account the differences in both finance and cycling by looking at the nature of the rules and institutions governing the field. Second, I estimate the attention effect on new regulation in response to crises or scandals. The interest of the paper is in the alignment of incentives to prevent regulatory capture and to ensure accountability and enforceability. The paper concludes that the differences hold important lessons that call for the reform of rules and institutions governing finance and cycling alike.
This paper analyzes different government debt relief programs in the European Monetary Union. I build a model and study different options ranging from debt relief to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The analysis reveals the following: First, patient countries repay debt, while impatient countries more likely consume and default. Second, without ESM loans, indebted countries default anyway. Third, if the probability to be an impatient government is high, then the supply of loans is constrained. In general, sustainable and unsustainable governments should be incentivized differently especially in a supranational monetary union. Finally, I develop policy recommendations for the ongoing debate in the Eurozone.
This paper provides new evidence on the formation and anchoring of inflation expectations. I conduct a game experiment and analyze the adjustment as well as the impact of credible targets on expectations. In addition, I evaluate the idiosyncratic determinants on the formation of expectations. The analysis reveals six results: First, I find evidence that long-term inflation expectations are firmly anchored to a credible target. Second, a temporary deviation due to unexpected monetary policy might trigger a decline in credibility, and third a de-anchoring of expectations due to uncertainty. Fourth, I find that people change their expectations little if a credible target exists. Fifth, expectations exhibit a large degree of time-variance only in environments without a target. Sixth, the dynamic adjustment to an ‘incomplete’ equilibrium, which is theoretically unstable, is nevertheless rapid and persistent in case of credible targets. All in all, I demonstrate a unique game setup with contributions to both experimental and monetary economics.
Usually financial crises go along with bubbles in asset prices, such as the housing bubble in the US in 2007. This paper attempts to build a mathematical model of financial bubbles from an econophysics, and thus a new perspective. I find that agents identify bubbles only with a time delay. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the detection of bubbles is different on either the individual or collective point of view. Second, I utilize the findings for a new definition of asset bubbles in finance. Finally, I extend the model to the study of asset price dynamics with news. In conclusion, the model provides unique insights into the properties and developments of financial bubbles.
The paper designs a quantum model of decision-making (QMDM) that utilizes neuroscientific evidence. The new model provides both normative and positive implications to economics. First, it enhances the study of decision-making which is an extension of the expected utility theory (EUT) in mathematical economics. Second, we demonstrate how the quantum model mitigates drawbacks of the expected utility theory of today.
This paper analyzes governance mechanisms for different group sizes. The European sovereign debt crisis has demonstrated the need of efficient governance for different group sizes. I find that self-governance only works for sufficiently homogenous and small neighbourhoods. Second, as long as the union expands, the effect of credible self-governance decreases. Third, spill-over effects amplify the size effect. Fourth, I show that sufficiently large monetary unions, are better off with costly but external governance or a free market mechanism. Finally, intermediate-size unions are most difficult to govern efficiently.
This paper develops a linear and tractable model of financial bubbles. I demonstrate the application of the linear model and study the root causes of financial bubbles. Moreover, I derive leading properties of bubbles. This model enables investors and regulators to react to market dynamics in a timely manner. In conclusion, the linear model is helpful for the empirical verification and detection of financial bubbles.