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The paper studies the reform package proposed by the European Commission on 6 December 2017. First, institutional and economic implications of the reform proposal are analysed. The paper finds that some proposals are beyond the present treaty provisions. For instance, the proposal of a fiscal capacity does not tackle the economic root causes without a supranational transfer mechanism. In fact, the proposed budget neutrality over the medium-term is unfeasible due to cross country heterogeneity in the Eurozone. At the end, the paper develops policy conclusions.
This paper studies whether a monetary union needs a fical union in particular in the Eurozone. On 1 January 1999, despite controversial debates, the rule-based Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) started without a fiscal union. I show that there is weak economic convergence in the EMU since 18 years. In addition, I argue that a fiscal union does not solve the past disintegration failures.
I demonstrate that the major flaws are domestic policy failures and not institutional failures in the euro area. Consequently, establishing a monetary union without having a political union is a risky strategy. Indeed, the rule-based architecture of Maastricht is not guilty for the crisis alone. The root causes are the political flaws aligned with the rather weak enforcement of the rules. I propose a genuine redesign of the rule-based paradigm without a fiscal union. Yet a monetary union without a fiscal union works effectively if the rule enforcement is more automatic and independent of domestic and European policy-making.
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been in turmoil for more than six years. The present governance rules do not seem to solve the problems neither permanently nor effectively. There is no vision about the future of Europe in the 21st century. This article describes a realignment of the economic governance, which does not necessarily lead to a transfer or political union. However, it solves the current and future challenges. In fact, the redesign of present rules is the most likely as well as legally and economically option today. The key ideais the detachment from the compulsive idea of an ever closer union. However, this vision requires boldness towards greater flexibility together with an exit clause or a state insolvency procedure for incompliant member states.
This paper models the political budget cycle with stochastic differential equations. The paper highlights the development of future volatility of the budget cycle. In fact, I confirm the proposition of a less volatile budget cycle in future. Moreover, I show that this trend is even amplified due to higher transparency. These findings are new evidence in the literature on electoral cycles. I calibrate a rigorous stochastic model on public deficit-to-GDP data for several countries from 1970 to 2012.
Die weiterhin hohen Schulden in einigen Staaten der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion lassen nach wie vor staatliche Insolvenzen befürchten. Um die entstandenen Probleme zu bewältigen, aber auch damit eine solche Situation erst gar nicht eintritt, hält der Autor eine staatliche Insovenzordnung – mit Bail-out durch die anderen Mitgliedstaaten nur in Notfällen – für erforderlich. Er schlägt einen staatlichen Abwicklungsmechanismus für überschuldete Euro-Länder vor, der auf einem Konzept des Sachverständigenrates für Wirtschaft von 2016 beruht.
This paper studies whether a monetary union can be managed solely by a rule based approach. The Five Presidents’ Report of the European Union rejects this idea. It suggests a centralisation of powers. We analyse the philosophy of policy rules from the vantage point of the German economic school of thought. There is evidence that a monetary union consisting of sovereign states is well organised by rules, together with the principle of subsidiarity. The root cause of the euro crisis is rather the weak enforcement of rules, compounded by structural problems. Therefore, we suggest a genuine rule-based paradigm for a stable future of the Economic and Monetary Union.
This article is a review of the book "Brain computation as hierarchical abstraction" by Dana H. Ballard published by MIT press in 2015. The book series computational neuroscience familiarizes the reader with the computational aspects of brain functions based on neuroscientific evidence. It provides an excellent introduction of the functioning, i.e. the structure, the network and the routines of the brain in our daily life. The final chapters even discuss behavioral elements such as decision-making, emotions and consciousness. These topics are of high relevance in other sciences such as economics and philosophy. Overall, Ballard’s book stimulates a scientifically well-founded debate and, more importantly, reveals the need of an interdisciplinary dialogue towards social sciences.
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of transparency on the political budget cycle (PBC) over time and across countries. So far, the literature on electoral cycles finds evidence that cycles depend on the stage of an economy. However, the author shows – for the first time – a reliance of the budget cycle on transparency. The author uses a new data set consisting of 99 developing and 34 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries. First, the author develops a model and demonstrates that transparency mitigates the political cycles. Second, the author confirms the proposition through the econometric assessment. The author uses time series data from 1970 to 2014 and discovers smaller cycles in countries with higher transparency, especially G8 countries.
Die Europäische Währungs- und Wirtschaftsunion (EWWU) bedarf einer weiteren Stabilisierung, da die institutionellen Regelungen langfristig keine hinreichende Bindekraft auf die Mitgliedsländer entfalten. Die Herausforderung ist die Rückgewinnung der verlorengegangenen Glaubwürdigkeit in das Regelwerk im Zuge der europäischen Staatsverschuldungskrise seit dem Jahr 2010. Um die Währungsunion zu erhalten, muss einerseits im Primärrecht das "No Bailout" in Art. 125 AEUV glaubwürdig angewandt werden können und andererseits die Regelungen im Sekundärrecht, u.a. der Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt, der Fiskalpakt oder das europäische Semester, unabhängiger und schneller rechtsverbindlich vollzogen werden. Der hier vorgeschlagene und klug in den europäischen Rahmen eingepasste "staatliche Insolvenzmechanismus", verbunden mit einer im Ultima Ratio rechtsverbindlichen "Austrittsklausel" wäre ein Lösungsansatz. Ein Scheitern der EWWU ist abwendbar, aber der fehlende Reformwille könnte dem Zerfall der Währungsunion Vorschub leisten.
This article studies the development of e-governance over time and across countries. We use a large data sample consisting of 99 developing and 34 OECD countries to study this notion. Firstly, we study the development of e-governance. Secondly, we estimate models to check the determining factors of e-governance over time and across countries. The study reveals that the level of e-governance is determined by the degree of e-participation, online access as well as GDP per capita.