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This article analyses and compares the performance of regulators in the fields of finance and sport, especially cycling. I hypothesize that the courses of crises or scandals is the best time to study the lessons of regulatory response. First, I take into account the differences in both finance and cycling by looking at the nature of the rules and institutions governing the field. Second, I estimate the attention effect on new regulation in response to crises or scandals. The interest of the paper is in the alignment of incentives to prevent regulatory capture and to ensure accountability and enforceability. The paper concludes that the differences hold important lessons that call for the reform of rules and institutions governing finance and cycling alike.
This paper examines the determinants of Google search in the banking area. The weekly Google data from 2004 to 2013 used for this study consists of the 30 largest banks, the Federal Reserve, and the European Central Bank. To my knowledge, this is the first study on the determinants of Google data. Firstly the paper shows that Google searches are correlated with several performance variables and market data, such as asset prices and trading volume. Secondly it demonstrates that banks´ internal performance data has a major influence whereas market data is rather insignificant. Moreover it is shown that Google search for central banks is largely determined by the level of interest rates as well as the inflation and output gap. This is evidence that central bank attention is primarily driven by the policy targets. Accordingly Google data can be applied to analyze the timely impact of monetary policy.
Die weiterhin hohen Schulden in einigen Staaten der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion lassen nach wie vor staatliche Insolvenzen befürchten. Um die entstandenen Probleme zu bewältigen, aber auch damit eine solche Situation erst gar nicht eintritt, hält der Autor eine staatliche Insovenzordnung – mit Bail-out durch die anderen Mitgliedstaaten nur in Notfällen – für erforderlich. Er schlägt einen staatlichen Abwicklungsmechanismus für überschuldete Euro-Länder vor, der auf einem Konzept des Sachverständigenrates für Wirtschaft von 2016 beruht.
The aim of this work is to establish and generalize a relationship between fractional partial differential equations (fPDEs) and stochastic differential equations (SDEs) to a wider class of stochastic processes, including fractional Brownian motions and sub-fractional Brownian motions with Hurst parameter H ∈ (1/2,1). We start by establishing the connection between a fPDE and SDE via the Feynman-Kac Theorem, which provides a stochastic representation of a general Cauchy problem. In hindsight, we extend this connection by assuming SDEs with fractional and sub-fractional Brownian motions and prove the generalized Feynman-Kac formulas under a (sub-)fractional Brownian motion. An application of the theorem demonstrates, as a by-product, the solution of a fractional integral, which has relevance in probability theory.
Usually financial crises go along with bubbles in asset prices, such as the housing bubble in the US in 2007. This paper attempts to build a mathematical model of financial bubbles from an econophysics, and thus a new perspective. I find that agents identify bubbles only with a time delay. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the detection of bubbles is different on either the individual or collective point of view. Second, I utilize the findings for a new definition of asset bubbles in finance. Finally, I extend the model to the study of asset price dynamics with news. In conclusion, the model provides unique insights into the properties and developments of financial bubbles.
A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that money market freezes have major macroeconomic implications. This paper develops a tractable model in which we analyze the microeconomic and macroeconomic implications of a systemic banking crisis. In particular, we consider how the systemic crisis affects the optimal allocation of funding for businesses. We show that a central bank should reduce the interest rate to manage a systemic shock and hence smooth the macroeconomic consequences. Moreover, the analysis offers insight on the rational of bank behavior and the role of markets in a systemic crisis. We find that the failure to adopt the optimal policy can lead to economic fragility.
This paper provides a quantitative approach to measuring the effectiveness of ambush marketing by using Google data. To our knowledge, it is one of the first studies that develop an empirical approach that directly measures the attention effect of ambush marketing in sports. The new data consists of 14 ambushers (treatment group) and 26 official sponsors (control group) and covers the time period of 2004 to 2012. These firms conducted marketing activities during the past football World Cups and European Championships. The innovation in our paper is the measurement method of attention by means of Google. The results are as follows: First ambush marketing increases product attention significantly. Second the product awareness of ambushers is greater or the same to that of official sponsors. Finally, we demonstrate that ambush marketing has positive impacts on the company's performance. Overall, we conclude that Google provide new insights for the analysis of ambush marketing.
This paper provides new evidence on the formation and anchoring of inflation expectations. I conduct a game experiment and analyze the adjustment as well as the impact of credible targets on expectations. In addition, I evaluate the idiosyncratic determinants on the formation of expectations. The analysis reveals six results: First, I find evidence that long-term inflation expectations are firmly anchored to a credible target. Second, a temporary deviation due to unexpected monetary policy might trigger a decline in credibility, and third a de-anchoring of expectations due to uncertainty. Fourth, I find that people change their expectations little if a credible target exists. Fifth, expectations exhibit a large degree of time-variance only in environments without a target. Sixth, the dynamic adjustment to an ‘incomplete’ equilibrium, which is theoretically unstable, is nevertheless rapid and persistent in case of credible targets. All in all, I demonstrate a unique game setup with contributions to both experimental and monetary economics.
Applied mathematical theory for monetary-fiscal interaction in a supranational monetary union
(2014)
I utilize a differentiable dynamical system á la Lotka-Voletrra and explain monetary and fiscal interaction in a supranational monetary union. The paper demonstrates an applied mathematical approach that provides useful insights about the interaction mechanisms in theoretical economics in general and a monetary union in particular. I find that a common central bank is necessary but not sufficient to tackle the new interaction problems in a supranational monetary union, such as the free-riding behaviour of fiscal policies. Moreover, I show that upranational institutions, rules or laws are essential to mitigate violations of decentralized fiscal policies.
This paper analyzes governance mechanisms for different group sizes. The European sovereign debt crisis has demonstrated the need of efficient governance for different group sizes. I find that self-governance only works for sufficiently homogenous and small neighbourhoods. Second, as long as the union expands, the effect of credible self-governance decreases. Third, spill-over effects amplify the size effect. Fourth, I show that sufficiently large monetary unions, are better off with costly but external governance or a free market mechanism. Finally, intermediate-size unions are most difficult to govern efficiently.