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This paper generalizes the theory of policy uncertainty with the new literature on rational inattention. First, the model demonstrates that inattention is dependent on the signal variance and the policy parameter. Second, I discover a novel trade-off showing that a policy instrument mitigates attention. Third, the policy instrument is non-linear and reciprocal to both the size and variance of the signal. The unifying theory creates new implications to economic theory and public policy alike.
Game theory is the study of how people behave in strategic situatons. By "strategic" we mean a situation in which each person, when deciding what actions to take, must consider how others might respond to that action. Like other fields in economics, game theory consists of a collection of models. The understanding that game-theoretic models give is particularly relevant in the social, political, and economic areas.
Behavioral economics links social, cognitive and emotional elements to help understand and explain the economic decision-making of individuals and institutions. The focus of research in behavioral economics is on individual choice and the motives underlying that choice. This study booklet introduces the key features and ideas of behavioral economics.
This article investigates the fundamental value of digital platforms, such as Facebook and Google. Despite the transformative nature of digital technologies, it is challenging to value digital services, given that the usage is free of charge. Applying the methodology of discrete choice experiments, we estimated the value of digital free goods. For the first time in the literature, we obtained data for the willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept, together with socio-economic variables. The customer´s valuation of free digital services is on average, for Google, 121 € per week and Facebook, 28 €.
The paper studies the reform package proposed by the European Commission on 6 December 2017. First, institutional and economic implications of the reform proposal are analysed. The paper finds that some proposals are beyond the present treaty provisions. For instance, the proposal of a fiscal capacity does not tackle the economic root causes without a supranational transfer mechanism. In fact, the proposed budget neutrality over the medium-term is unfeasible due to cross country heterogeneity in the Eurozone. At the end, the paper develops policy conclusions.
This paper studies whether a monetary union needs a fical union in particular in the Eurozone. On 1 January 1999, despite controversial debates, the rule-based Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) started without a fiscal union. I show that there is weak economic convergence in the EMU since 18 years. In addition, I argue that a fiscal union does not solve the past disintegration failures.
I demonstrate that the major flaws are domestic policy failures and not institutional failures in the euro area. Consequently, establishing a monetary union without having a political union is a risky strategy. Indeed, the rule-based architecture of Maastricht is not guilty for the crisis alone. The root causes are the political flaws aligned with the rather weak enforcement of the rules. I propose a genuine redesign of the rule-based paradigm without a fiscal union. Yet a monetary union without a fiscal union works effectively if the rule enforcement is more automatic and independent of domestic and European policy-making.
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been in turmoil for more than six years. The present governance rules do not seem to solve the problems neither permanently nor effectively. There is no vision about the future of Europe in the 21st century. This article describes a realignment of the economic governance, which does not necessarily lead to a transfer or political union. However, it solves the current and future challenges. In fact, the redesign of present rules is the most likely as well as legally and economically option today. The key ideais the detachment from the compulsive idea of an ever closer union. However, this vision requires boldness towards greater flexibility together with an exit clause or a state insolvency procedure for incompliant member states.
This paper models the political budget cycle with stochastic differential equations. The paper highlights the development of future volatility of the budget cycle. In fact, I confirm the proposition of a less volatile budget cycle in future. Moreover, I show that this trend is even amplified due to higher transparency. These findings are new evidence in the literature on electoral cycles. I calibrate a rigorous stochastic model on public deficit-to-GDP data for several countries from 1970 to 2012.
This paper studies whether a monetary union can be managed solely by a rule based approach. The Five Presidents’ Report of the European Union rejects this idea. It suggests a centralisation of powers. We analyse the philosophy of policy rules from the vantage point of the German economic school of thought. There is evidence that a monetary union consisting of sovereign states is well organised by rules, together with the principle of subsidiarity. The root cause of the euro crisis is rather the weak enforcement of rules, compounded by structural problems. Therefore, we suggest a genuine rule-based paradigm for a stable future of the Economic and Monetary Union.