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This paper studies option pricing based on a reverse engineering (RE) approach. We utilize artificial intelligence in order to numerically compute the prices of options. The data consist of more than 5000 call- and put-options from the German stock market. First, we find that option pricing under reverse engineering obtains a smaller root mean square error to market prices. Second, we show that the reverse engineering model is reliant on training data. In general, the novel idea of reverse engineering is a rewarding direction for future research. It circumvents the limitations of finance theory, among others strong assumptions and numerical approximations under the Black–Scholes model.
Since the global financial crisis of 2008/2009, there has been no challenge to the financial and banking system comparable to that during the Corona crisis.
Weak profitability, unresolved regulatory challenges and increasing competition in the digital sector pose further challenges for banks.
The stability of the financial system and access to financial markets was not at risk during the pandemic. Through joint efforts and better bank capitalisation, the financial system is now more resilient than during the financial crisis.
Provided that grants and loans in the “next generation EU” fund are well targeted for structural reforms and investments in the future, this should boost confi-dence and growth.
However, further improvements in financial stability, such as increased capital requirements, regulation of shadow banks or reforms in financial supervision, are needed.
The paper studies the reform package proposed by the European Commission on 6 December 2017. First, institutional and economic implications of the reform proposal are analysed. The paper finds that some proposals are beyond the present treaty provisions. For instance, the proposal of a fiscal capacity does not tackle the economic root causes without a supranational transfer mechanism. In fact, the proposed budget neutrality over the medium-term is unfeasible due to cross country heterogeneity in the Eurozone. At the end, the paper develops policy conclusions.
The paper designs a quantum model of decision-making (QMDM) that utilizes neuroscientific evidence. The new model provides both normative and positive implications to economics. First, it enhances the study of decision-making which is an extension of the expected utility theory (EUT) in mathematical economics. Second, we demonstrate how the quantum model mitigates drawbacks of the expected utility theory of today.
We investigate public debt sustainability in Europe and leading industrialised countries. The recent debate about the debt ceiling in the US and the sovereign debt crisis in Europe demonstrate the urgency of the topic. We measure debt sustainability of public finance with a standard and alternative methodology and compare both results. We use panel data of 205 OECD countries from 1970 to 2014. The paper finds unsustainable public debt levels for almost all countries in the past decades. Furthermore, given the low economic growth and demographic challenge ahead, debt levels may upsurge even more. There is a huge looming ‘debt meltdown’ on the horizon if countries do not change public policy soon.
This paper studies whether a monetary union can be managed solely by a rule based approach. The Five Presidents’ Report of the European Union rejects this idea. It suggests a centralisation of powers. We analyse the philosophy of policy rules from the vantage point of the German economic school of thought. There is evidence that a monetary union consisting of sovereign states is well organised by rules, together with the principle of subsidiarity. The root cause of the euro crisis is rather the weak enforcement of rules, compounded by structural problems. Therefore, we suggest a genuine rule-based paradigm for a stable future of the Economic and Monetary Union.
In this paper, we examine the political gridlock in reforming the Economic and Monetary Union. We utilize a two–stage game with imperfect information in order to study the optimal sequencing. The main results are: first, optimal sequencing requires for incompliant Member States a default option in stage–two, which in principle is related to the today's fiscal architecture (EMU-I). Second, we show that compliant countries prefer a reform equilibrium today if and only if they have a free choice about the preferred fiscal architecture at the end — either EMU-II with binding European coordination or EMU-I related to Maastricht. Noteworthy, our sequencing approach works for any design of the EMU-II architecture.
This paper studies the impact of financial liquidity on the macro-economy. We extend a classic macroeconomic modeland compute numerical simulations. The model confirms that persistently low inflation can occur despite a high degreeof financial liquidity due to a reallocation of cash, normal and risk-free bonds. In that regard, our model uncovers anexplanation of a flat Phillips curve. Overall, our approach contributes to a rather disregarded matter in macroeconomictheory.
This paper models the political budget cycle with stochastic differential equations. The paper highlights the development of future volatility of the budget cycle. In fact, I confirm the proposition of a less volatile budget cycle in future. Moreover, I show that this trend is even amplified due to higher transparency. These findings are new evidence in the literature on electoral cycles. I calibrate a rigorous stochastic model on public deficit-to-GDP data for several countries from 1970 to 2012.
This paper analyzes different government debt relief programs in the European Monetary Union. I build a model and study different options ranging from debt relief to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The analysis reveals the following: First, patient countries repay debt, while impatient countries more likely consume and default. Second, without ESM loans, indebted countries default anyway. Third, if the probability to be an impatient government is high, then the supply of loans is constrained. In general, sustainable and unsustainable governments should be incentivized differently especially in a supranational monetary union. Finally, I develop policy recommendations for the ongoing debate in the Eurozone.