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Das Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfG) vom 5. Mai 2020 ist Schlusspunkt und zugleich Neuanfang nach einer jahrelangen verfassungsrechtlichen und ökonomischen Auseinandersetzung. Im Prinzip geht es um die konstituierenden Prinzipien der Eurozone sowie das Mandat der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB). Der EU-Vertrag charakterisiert die Leitplanken der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (WWU) im Spannungsfeld der Art. 119, 123 und 125 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union (AEUV). Mithin liegt die wirtschaftspolitische Souveränität – nach dem Prinzip Haftung und Kontrolle – allein bei den Mitgliedstaaten. Die Organe der Europäischen Union (EU) sowie der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union (EuGH) legen diese Leitplanken gemäß dem Leitgedanken in Art. 1 des Vertrags über die Europäische Union (EUV) einer „ever closer union“ regelmäßig mit weitem Ermessen aus.
Die Europäische Währungs- und Wirtschaftsunion (EWWU) bedarf einer weiteren Stabilisierung, da die institutionellen Regelungen langfristig keine hinreichende Bindekraft auf die Mitgliedsländer entfalten. Die Herausforderung ist die Rückgewinnung der verlorengegangenen Glaubwürdigkeit in das Regelwerk im Zuge der europäischen Staatsverschuldungskrise seit dem Jahr 2010. Um die Währungsunion zu erhalten, muss einerseits im Primärrecht das "No Bailout" in Art. 125 AEUV glaubwürdig angewandt werden können und andererseits die Regelungen im Sekundärrecht, u.a. der Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt, der Fiskalpakt oder das europäische Semester, unabhängiger und schneller rechtsverbindlich vollzogen werden. Der hier vorgeschlagene und klug in den europäischen Rahmen eingepasste "staatliche Insolvenzmechanismus", verbunden mit einer im Ultima Ratio rechtsverbindlichen "Austrittsklausel" wäre ein Lösungsansatz. Ein Scheitern der EWWU ist abwendbar, aber der fehlende Reformwille könnte dem Zerfall der Währungsunion Vorschub leisten.
This paper models the political budget cycle with stochastic differential equations. The paper highlights the development of future volatility of the budget cycle. In fact, I confirm the proposition of a less volatile budget cycle in future. Moreover, I show that this trend is even amplified due to higher transparency. These findings are new evidence in the literature on electoral cycles. I calibrate a rigorous stochastic model on public deficit-to-GDP data for several countries from 1970 to 2012.
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been in turmoil for more than six years. The present governance rules do not seem to solve the problems neither permanently nor effectively. There is no vision about the future of Europe in the 21st century. This article describes a realignment of the economic governance, which does not necessarily lead to a transfer or political union. However, it solves the current and future challenges. In fact, the redesign of present rules is the most likely as well as legally and economically option today. The key ideais the detachment from the compulsive idea of an ever closer union. However, this vision requires boldness towards greater flexibility together with an exit clause or a state insolvency procedure for incompliant member states.
The paper studies the reform package proposed by the European Commission on 6 December 2017. First, institutional and economic implications of the reform proposal are analysed. The paper finds that some proposals are beyond the present treaty provisions. For instance, the proposal of a fiscal capacity does not tackle the economic root causes without a supranational transfer mechanism. In fact, the proposed budget neutrality over the medium-term is unfeasible due to cross country heterogeneity in the Eurozone. At the end, the paper develops policy conclusions.
This article investigates the fundamental value of digital platforms, such as Facebook and Google. Despite the transformative nature of digital technologies, it is challenging to value digital services, given that the usage is free of charge. Applying the methodology of discrete choice experiments, we estimated the value of digital free goods. For the first time in the literature, we obtained data for the willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept, together with socio-economic variables. The customer´s valuation of free digital services is on average, for Google, 121 € per week and Facebook, 28 €.
This paper studies whether a monetary union needs a fical union in particular in the Eurozone. On 1 January 1999, despite controversial debates, the rule-based Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) started without a fiscal union. I show that there is weak economic convergence in the EMU since 18 years. In addition, I argue that a fiscal union does not solve the past disintegration failures.
I demonstrate that the major flaws are domestic policy failures and not institutional failures in the euro area. Consequently, establishing a monetary union without having a political union is a risky strategy. Indeed, the rule-based architecture of Maastricht is not guilty for the crisis alone. The root causes are the political flaws aligned with the rather weak enforcement of the rules. I propose a genuine redesign of the rule-based paradigm without a fiscal union. Yet a monetary union without a fiscal union works effectively if the rule enforcement is more automatic and independent of domestic and European policy-making.
Die hohen Schulden in einigen Staaten der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion lassen nach wie vor staatliche Insolvenzen befürchten. Um die bereits entstandenen Probleme zu bewältigen, aber auch damit eine solche Situation künftig gar nicht erst eintritt, ist eine staatliche Insolvenzordnung erforderlich.
Behavioral economics links social, cognitive and emotional elements to help understand and explain the economic decision-making of individuals and institutions. The focus of research in behavioral economics is on individual choice and the motives underlying that choice. This study booklet introduces the key features and ideas of behavioral economics.
Game theory is the study of how people behave in strategic situatons. By "strategic" we mean a situation in which each person, when deciding what actions to take, must consider how others might respond to that action. Like other fields in economics, game theory consists of a collection of models. The understanding that game-theoretic models give is particularly relevant in the social, political, and economic areas.
This paper develops a new methodology in order to study the role of dynamic expectations. Neither reference-point theories nor feedback models are sufficient to describe human expectations in a dynamic market environment. We use an interdisciplinary approach and demonstrate that expectations of non-learning agents are time-invariant and isotropic. On the contrary, learning enhances expectations. We uncover the “yardstick of expectations” in order to assess the impact of market developments on expectations. For the first time in the literature, we reveal new insights about the motion of dynamic expectations. Finally, the model is suitable for an AI approach and has major implications on the behaviour of market participants.
Nach der Euro- und Wirtschaftskrise in den Jahren seit 2010 verzeichnet die Europäische Union (EU) derzeit einen soliden Wirtschaftsaufschwung in allen Mitgliedstaaten. Der Anteil Europas an der Weltwirtschaft beträgt rund 30 Prozent. Das europäische Wirtschaftswachstum ist 2018 mit 2,1 Prozent sogar größer als das in Deutschland mit 1,6 Prozent. Eine Analyse der Dauer von Aufschwungsphasen zeigt, dass Europa im Vergleich zur Weltwirtschaft sogar unerwarteter Spitzenreiter ist. Seit den 1970er-Jahren liegt die durchschnittliche Dauer eines europäischen Wirtschaftsaufschwungs bei über dreißig Quartalen; sie ist mithin deutlich höher als in den USA und Japan.
This paper generalizes the theory of policy uncertainty with the new literature on rational inattention. First, the model demonstrates that inattention is dependent on the signal variance and the policy parameter. Second, I discover a novel trade-off showing that a policy instrument mitigates attention. Third, the policy instrument is non-linear and reciprocal to both the size and variance of the signal. The unifying theory creates new implications to economic theory and public policy alike.
Das Phänomen des Populismus wird in den verschiedensten wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen seit Jahrzehnten erörtert. Dss vorherrschende Narrativ ist aber ökonomischer Natur. Die (Finanz-)Globalisierung und der technologische Fortschritt entfremden die Menschen und bewirken Verunsicherung. Zudem erkennen die Bürger mehr die Herausforderungen als die Chancen in diesem Transformationsprozess.
This article studies the renewed interest surrounding sustainable public finance and the topic of tax evasion as well as the new theory of information inattention. Extending a model of tax evasion with the notion of inattention reveals novel findings about policy instruments that can be used to mitigate tax evasion. We show that the attention parameters regarding tax rates, financial penalty schemes and income levels are as important as the level of the detection probability and the financial penalty incurred. Thus, our theory recommends the enhancement of sustainability in public policy, particularly in tax policy. Consequently, the paper contributes both to the academic and public policy debate.
This article explores the determinants of people’s growth prospects in survey data as well as the impact of the European recovery fund to future growth. The focus is on the aftermath of the Corona pandemic, which is a natural limit to the sample size. We use Eurobarometer survey data and macroeconomic variables, such as GDP, unemployment, public deficit, inflation, bond yields, and fiscal spending data. We estimate a variety of panel regression models and develop a new simulation-regression methodology due to limitation of the sample size. We find the major determinant of people’s growth prospect is domestic GDP per capita, while European fiscal aid does not significantly matter. In addition, we exhibit with the simulation-regression method novel scientific insights, significant outcomes, and a policy conclusion alike.
On 5 May 2020, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany announced in a momentous ruling that the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the European Central Bank (ECB) exceeds European Union (EU) competences. This decision initiated a lively debate in law and economics all over Europe. This article provides a unique interdisciplinary reading of the ruling in order to clarify the line of argument. Considering a cross-disciplinary view enlightens the understanding of the historic judgment.
This article provides a stochastic agent-based model to exhibit the role of aggregation metrics in order to mitigate polarization in a complex society. Our sociophysics model is based on interacting and nonlinear Brownian agents, which allow us to study the emergence of collective opinions. The opinion of an agent, x i (t) is a continuous positive value in an interval [0, 1]. We find (i) most agent-metrics display similar outcomes. (ii) The middle-metric and noisy-metric obtain new opinion dynamics either towards assimilation or fragmentation. (iii) We show that a developed 2-stage metric provide new insights about convergence and equilibria. In summary, our simulation demonstrates the power of institutions, which affect the emergence of collective behavior. Consequently, opinion formation in a decentralized complex society is reliant to the individual information processing and rules of collective behavior.
Die Debatte über die Zukunft der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion ist seit geraumer Zeit omnipräsent (Herzog und Hengstermann 2013). Mit der temporären Aussetzung der europäischen (nationalen) Schuldenregeln bis zum 31. Dezember 2022 ging abermals eine leidenschaftlich geführte Post-Covid-19-Reformdiskussion los. Zu den bisherigen Veränderungsnotwendigkeiten kommen nunmehr die geopolitischen Herausforderungen hinzu. Ist die Stabilität der Währungsunion in Gefahr?