330 Wirtschaft
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This article examines the risks and societal costs associated with flexible average inflation targeting in the United States and symmetric inflation targeting in the Eurozone. Employing an empirical approach, we analyze monthly cumulative inflation gaps over a monetary policy horizon of 36 months. By investigating the trajectories of the cumulative inflation gaps, we find a heavy tailed distribution and a 20 percent probability of over- and undershooting the inflation target. We exhibit that the offsetting mechanism introduced in the revised monetary strategies lack credibility in ensuring price stability during a period of persistent inflation. Consequently, the credibility of central banks may be compromised. The policy implications are the integration of an escape clause and prompt monetary corrections in cases where the inflation goal is not achieved. This study provides insights for policymakers and central banks, emphasizing challenges in maintaining credibility and price stability within the new monetary strategies.
Game theory is the study of how people behave in strategic situatons. By "strategic" we mean a situation in which each person, when deciding what actions to take, must consider how others might respond to that action. Like other fields in economics, game theory consists of a collection of models. The understanding that game-theoretic models give is particularly relevant in the social, political, and economic areas.
Behavioral economics links social, cognitive and emotional elements to help understand and explain the economic decision-making of individuals and institutions. The focus of research in behavioral economics is on individual choice and the motives underlying that choice. This study booklet introduces the key features and ideas of behavioral economics.
This paper studies whether a monetary union needs a fical union in particular in the Eurozone. On 1 January 1999, despite controversial debates, the rule-based Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) started without a fiscal union. I show that there is weak economic convergence in the EMU since 18 years. In addition, I argue that a fiscal union does not solve the past disintegration failures.
I demonstrate that the major flaws are domestic policy failures and not institutional failures in the euro area. Consequently, establishing a monetary union without having a political union is a risky strategy. Indeed, the rule-based architecture of Maastricht is not guilty for the crisis alone. The root causes are the political flaws aligned with the rather weak enforcement of the rules. I propose a genuine redesign of the rule-based paradigm without a fiscal union. Yet a monetary union without a fiscal union works effectively if the rule enforcement is more automatic and independent of domestic and European policy-making.